Outside Capital Is No Longer Buying Law Firms; It Is Buying Their Back-Office Companies / 外部资本不买律所了,改买律所的后台公司
外部资本不再买律所股权,改投拆出来的后台公司;单笔估值约 7 亿美元,分律师费红线仍绕不开。 / Outside capital is no longer buying law-firm equity; it invests in the carved-out back-office company. A single deal reached about US$700 million, but the bar on sharing legal fees still stands.
Over the past year, the capital entering legal services has changed course: it no longer competes for equity in a law firm, but instead flows into the company next door that does no legal work and only runs the back office. A single deal has pushed valuations to about US$700 million, behind which lies an old rule that has repeatedly been worked around: non-lawyers may not own law firms.
过去一年,进入法律服务市场的资金换了一种方式:它不再争着买下一家律所的股权,而是把资金投进律所隔壁那家不办业务、只管后台的公司。单笔交易把估值推到约7亿美元,背后是一条被反复绕开的旧规则:非律师不得拥有律所。
Spinning Off the Back Office, and Selling It to Outside Capital
把律所后台拆出来,由资本买下
In October 2026, the UK boutique law firm Centrefield accepted an investment from the mid-market fund Palatine to finance expansion into the United States and continental Europe. In the previous financial year Centrefield’s net assets rose 46% to £4.1 million and revenue grew 20%; what the investor wanted was precisely the high margins and steady cash flow.
2026年10月,英国精品律所 Centrefield 接受了中端市场基金 Palatine 的投资,用于向美国和欧洲大陆扩张。Centrefield 上一财年净资产增46%至410万英镑,业务收入增20%,投资人看中的正是高利润率和稳定现金流。
The back-office company acquired in these deals has a name in the industry: a management services organization. The firm carves out the half that does not handle cases (bookkeeping, human resources, technology and administration), puts it into a separate company, and outside capital buys that company’s equity. The firm remains owned by its lawyers; cases and client relationships stay where they were, and the investor has no say in decisions about legal practice.
这类交易里被买下的后台公司,行业里有个名字:管理服务商(management services organization)。律所把不办案的那一半(记账、人事、技术、行政)拆出来,装进一家独立公司,由外部资本买下这家公司的股权。律所仍由律师持有,办案和客户关系留在原处,投资人不碰执业决策。
Why this is happening in a cluster now has to do with both sides. On the firm’s own side is its arithmetic: expansion used to be slow, and partners’ retained earnings each year plus bank borrowing were enough to cover it. Now, investments of the artificial-intelligence and data-systems kind demand a large sum up front. Partners neither want to take that money out of the current year’s distributions, nor can retained earnings alone raise it, or raise it fast enough. On the private equity side is a different arithmetic: law firms have high margins and steady cash flow, and can weather economic ups and downs better than the manufacturing businesses private equity usually backs. That is why private equity is willing to pay more for these back-office companies. One side needs capital and the other is willing to supply it; once the two connect, the capital comes in.
它为什么在此时密集出现,原因在两边。一边是律所自己的账:过去律所扩张慢,资金靠合伙人每年的留存收益和银行借款就够花。现在人工智能、数据系统这类投入,得一次性掏出一大笔。合伙人既不想从眼前分红里扣这笔资金,光靠留存收益也凑不齐、凑不快。另一边是私募的账:律所利润率高、现金流稳,比私募惯常投的制造业更能扛住经济冷热。正因如此,私募愿意给这类后台公司多掏资金。一边要资金、一边愿意给,两边一接上,资金就进来了。
The Deals Already Add Up to Real Scale
这股交易的体量,已经不小
These deals have reached real scale. The US law firm Holland & Knight has done 25 deals this year involving management services organizations; the private equity firm Charlesbank’s investment in the back-office company of WSHB, a US insurance-defense law firm, pushed a single valuation to about US$700 million.
这股交易已经成规模。美国律所 Holland & Knight 年内已做成25笔与管理服务商相关的交易;私募机构 Charlesbank 对美国保险抗辩律所WSHB后台公司的投资,把单笔估值推到了约7亿美元。
WSHB did not sell its own legal-practice entity; it set up a new back-office services company, moved the non-legal work into it, and Charlesbank holds the equity. WSHB keeps control over its cases and client relationships; the capital it received goes into new markets, new technology and data capability.
WSHB 没有卖掉自己的执业主体,而是新设了一个后台服务公司,把非法律业务装进去,由 Charlesbank 持股。WSHB 保留对案件和客户关系的控制权;资本换来的资金投向新市场、新技术与数据能力。
Whether such a structure can work turns on how the management fee is set. The company held by outside capital is kept running by the service fees the firm pays; and ethics opinions in a number of US states require that this fee be either a fixed amount or calculated on a cost-plus basis, not a percentage of the firm’s revenue. Once it is tied to revenue, it crosses the line that legal fees may not be shared with non-lawyers.
这类结构能否运转,关键在于管理费怎么收。外部资本持有的那家公司,靠律所付的服务费维持经营;而美国多州的伦理意见要求,这笔管理费要么定一个固定金额,要么按成本加成来算,不能跟着律所收入按比例抽。一旦与收入挂钩,就触到律师费不能与非律师分享的红线。
The rule followed by most US states is exactly that line: non-lawyers may neither hold equity in a law firm nor take a share of its legal fees. Once the back office is moved into a separate entity, what the investor holds is that company and not the firm, so the ownership restriction has been worked around; but the restriction on sharing legal fees has not, and the management fee still may not be tied to revenue; tie it to revenue and the line is crossed. That is why regulators keep their eyes on how the fee is set: if a management fee that looks fixed in fact rises and falls with revenue, the compliance of the whole structure collapses.
美国多数州沿用的规范正是这条底线:非律师既不能持有律所股权,也不能分走律师费。把后台切到独立实体后,投资人持股的是那家公司、不是律所,持股这条算是绕过去了;但分律师费那条没绕,管理费仍不能随营收挂钩,一旦挂钩就还是踩线。也正因如此,监管的目光会一直盯在费用设置上:一笔看似固定的管理费,如果暗中与营收同涨同落,整个结构的合规性就垮了。
Law firm leaders still have reservations about such arrangements. What private equity puts on the table often asks partners to give up part of the current year’s distributions in the short term in exchange for a long-term asset that has not yet paid out. For equity partners used to dividing profits every year, the arithmetic is naturally unattractive: less distributed now, in return for a long-term interest that no one can say when it will turn into cash.
律所领导层对这类方案仍有疑虑。私募抛来的方案,往往要求合伙人在短期先让出一部分眼前分红,去换一个尚未兑现的长期资产。对习惯了每年分账的权益合伙人来说,这笔账天然不划算:眼前少分一块,换来的却是一笔不知何时能变成现金的长期权益。
The Difference Lies Not in Ambition but in the Channel
差异不在野心,而在通道
It is no accident that small and mid-sized firms have become the target in this wave. Investors avoid the largest firms because those are already big and leave little room to reshape; small and mid-sized specialist firms are at the stage where they need to add scale and systems, so expansion capital has a clear use. Capital comes in through just one structure, the management services organization: it takes a minority stake in the back-office company, seeks no control, and holds only a share of the cash flow.
这股浪潮里,中小律所成了目标不是偶然。投资人避开头部大律所,是因为大律所体量已大、改造空间小;中小专业律所正到了要扩规模、上系统的阶段,扩张资金正好有处可用。资本进场靠的就是管理服务商这一种结构:它拿后台公司的少数股权,不图控制权,只在现金流里占一个份额。
Turning to Chinese law firms, the same urge to expand runs into a different set of constraints. As of September 2025, there were about 830,000 licensed lawyers and about 45,000 law firms nationwide, a market made up mainly of small and mid-sized firms where economies of scale have not yet been fully released. The Lawyers Law keeps outside capital out: founders must be licensed lawyers (Article 14); a firm may open a branch in another place only after three years of existence and with twenty or more licensed lawyers (Article 19); and a firm may not carry on business other than legal services (Article 27). Taken together, the three provisions mean that capital for scaling can come only from partners’ contributions and retained earnings; outside capital can neither become a founder nor, as in the British and American markets, easily use a management services organization to commercialize the back office and then bring investment back in.
换到中国律所这边,同样的扩张冲动撞上的是另一套约束。截至2025年9月,全国执业律师约83万人、律师事务所约4.5万家,这是一个以中小律所为主、规模经济尚未充分释放的市场。《律师法》把外部资金挡在门外:设立人得是执业律师(第十四条);成立满三年、有二十名以上执业律师,才能去外地开分所(第十九条);律所不得做法律服务以外的生意(第二十七条)。三条合起来,规模化资金只能来自合伙人出资与留存收益,外部资本既不能成为设立人,也很难像英美市场那样借管理服务商把后台商业化、再反向引资。
In practice, Chinese law firms have scaled by opening branches, merging internally and forming loose alliances, with funding coming mainly from partners’ contributions, retained earnings accumulated over the years and bank credit. Without outside leverage, the pace of expansion can only follow retained earnings and the people a firm can attract: slow, but steady.
现实里,中国律所的规模化走的是设分支、内部合并、松散联盟的路,资金主要源于合伙人出资、历年留存和银行授信。缺少外部杠杆,扩张节奏只能跟着留存和人才走,慢但稳。
In the British and American markets, structural arrangements have split “owning a law firm” into “owning a law firm’s back office”, and the rules reach only the former; in China, the back office remains bound to the same license that says a firm may not engage in business other than legal services, so the door for capital to come in is far narrower. This difference sets the pace and the risk exposure of expansion for the two kinds of firm, and sets the regulatory focus each faces: one watches whether the management fee is a disguised sharing of profits, the other whether the source of the capital is clean.
英美市场用结构安排把“拥有律所”拆成了“拥有律所的后台”,规则只管住了前者;中国律所的后台仍被绑在“不得从事法律服务以外经营”的同一张执照上,资本进来的门因此窄得多。这条差异,决定了两类律所扩张的节奏与风险敞口,也决定了它们各自要面对的监管重点:一方盯管理费设置是否变相分利润,一方盯资本金来源是否清白。
Sources: The Global Legal Post (October 15, 2026); law.com / The American Lawyer (October 1, 2026); Reuters Legal (October 2026, two reports on Holland & Knight’s 25 management services organization deals and the roughly US$700 million Charlesbank–WSHB valuation); China Business Law Journal (May 2026; law.asia English edition, “China Business Law Awards 2026”, May 28, 2026), citing Ministry of Justice data as of September 2025; Lawyers Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 revision), Articles 14, 19 and 27.
来源:The Global Legal Post(2026年10月15日);law.com / The American Lawyer(2026年10月1日);Reuters Legal(2026年10月,Holland & Knight 25笔 管理服务商 交易、Charlesbank–WSHB 约7亿美元估值两篇报道);《商法》(China Business Law Journal,2026年5月;law.asia 英文版 “China Business Law Awards 2026” 2026年5月28日)援引司法部截至2025年9月数据;《中华人民共和国律师法》(2017年修正)第十四条、第十九条、第二十七条。
This article represents the author’s personal research views only and does not constitute legal advice.
本文仅代表作者个人研究观点,不构成任何法律意见或法律咨询建议。

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