The Trademark ‘Revival Channel’ Is Narrowing — What Is Contested Is the Degree / 商标”复活通道”将收窄，可争的是程度

After losing a trademark refusal-review, if the cited mark is revoked or invalidated, the applicant may still seek a retrial to “revive” the mark. But Article 28 of the draft judicial interpretation on administrative trademark authorization and rights-confirmation cases offers two tightening options — one closing the channel entirely, one half-open — neither leaving room for “maintaining the status quo.” The comment period closes on October 28.

商标驳回复审败诉后，若引证商标被撤销或无效，申请人仍可申请再审让商标”复活”。但商标授权确权司法解释征求意见稿第二十八条给出两套收紧方案，一个全关、一个半开，均未给”维持现状”留出选项。征求意见将于 10 月 28 日截止。

On September 14, 2026, the Supreme People’s Court issued an announcement soliciting public comments on the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Trademark Law of the PRC (Draft for Comment on Time Effect)” and the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases of Trademark Authorization and Rights Confirmation (Draft for Comment),” with a deadline of October 28, 2026. Of the two documents, what truly reshapes the landscape of administrative trademark litigation is the two alternative schemes set out in Article 28 of the latter.

2026 年 9 月 14 日，最高人民法院发布公告，就《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国商标法〉时间效力的若干规定（征求意见稿）》和《最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行政案件若干问题的规定（征求意见稿）》向社会公开征求意见，截止日期为 2026 年 10 月 28 日。两份文件中，真正牵动商标授权确权行政诉讼格局的，是后者第二十八条给出的两套备选方案。

Just months ago, the Trademark Law amendment, amid divergent opinions, left out the clause excluding change of circumstances, and this much-debated rule was preserved; now the draft judicial interpretation puts it back on the table — and this time both schemes point in the same direction: tightening. That what is gained may be lost again is no alarmism. To see where it is heading, one must first see what it looks like now.

就在几个月前，商标法修订因各方意见而未将排除情势变更的条款写入法律，这条饱受争议的规则得以保留；如今，司法解释征求意见稿又把它摆上了台面——而这一次，两套方案指向同一个方向：收紧。得而复失，恐怕不是危言耸听。要看懂它将走向哪里，得先看清它现在是什么样子。

A Longer Correction Channel Than Imagined

一条比想象中更长的纠偏通道

The old problem addressed by Article 28 is not limited to “the cited mark lapses during litigation.” Under current rules, even after a rejection decision has been upheld by a final judgment, so long as the cited mark is later revoked or declared invalid, the applicant may still seek a retrial on that basis, requesting revocation of the original judgment and an order to render a fresh ruling.

第二十八条处理的老问题，并不止于”诉讼期间引证商标失效”。依照现行规则，即便驳回决定已被生效判决维持，只要引证商标此后被撤销或宣告无效，申请人仍可以此为由申请再审，请求撤销原判、判令重新作出裁决。

The current “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases of Trademark Authorization and Rights Confirmation” (SPC Interpretation [2020] No. 19, as amended) provides in Article 28: “Where, in the course of trying an administrative case of trademark authorization or rights confirmation, the grounds on which the intellectual-property administration rejected, refused to approve registration of, or declared invalid the disputed mark cease to exist, the people’s court may, on the basis of the new facts, revoke the relevant ruling of the intellectual-property administration and order it to render a fresh ruling in light of the changed facts.”

现行《最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行政案件若干问题的规定》（法释〔2020〕19 号修正）第二十八条规定：”人民法院审理商标授权确权行政案件的过程中，国家知识产权局对诉争商标予以驳回、不予核准注册或者予以无效宣告的事由不复存在的，人民法院可以依据新的事实撤销国家知识产权局相关裁决，并判令其根据变更后的事实重新作出裁决。”

Take an example: the disputed mark is rejected for resemblance to a cited mark; both first and second instance uphold the rejection and the judgment becomes final; years later the cited mark is revoked for three years’ non-use. Under current rules, the applicant may still seek a retrial on this basis. Peng Xuelong and Shi Ke’s research sorts out the normative basis of this path: the fact that the cited mark was revoked or declared invalid can fall within the retrial ground of “new evidence sufficient to overturn the original judgment or ruling” listed in Article 110(1)(1) of the “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC” (SPC Interpretation [2018] No. 1); the party may file an application within six months from the date it knew or should have known.

试举一例：诉争商标因与引证商标近似被驳回，一审、二审均维持驳回决定，判决已生效；数年后，引证商标因连续三年不使用被撤销。依现行规则，申请人仍可据此寻求再审。彭学龙、史珂的研究梳理了这条路径的规范基础：引证商标被撤销、被宣告无效的事实，可以落入《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国行政诉讼法〉的解释》（法释〔2018〕1 号）第一百一十条第一款第一项所列”有新的证据，足以推翻原判决、裁定”的再审事由，当事人自知道或者应当知道之日起六个月内提出申请。

Years after the original judgment became final, a mark may still be “revived” through this path. Professional commentary points out that the current rules set no limit at the final-ruling stage — precisely the bull’s-eye of this amendment.

原判决生效多年之后，商标仍可能循此路径”复活”。有专业解读指出，现行规则并未在生效裁判处设置界限，这恰恰是此次修改的靶心。

The draft offers two schemes. Scheme One: “In trying rejection-review decisions, refusal-of-registration-review decisions, or invalidation rulings made by the trademark administration under Article 20 of the Trademark Law, the people’s court shall base itself on the factual state at the time the decision or ruling under review was made.”

征求意见稿给出了两套方案。方案一是：”人民法院审理国务院商标管理部门依据商标法第二十条作出的驳回复审决定、不予注册复审决定或者无效宣告裁定，应当以被诉决定、裁定作出时的事实状态为准。”

Scheme Two: “Where the grounds for rejecting, refusing to approve registration of, or declaring invalid the disputed mark cease to exist before the people’s court renders a final judgment in the trademark authorization or rights-confirmation case, the people’s court may, on the basis of new facts, revoke the relevant ruling of the trademark administration and order it to render a fresh ruling in light of the changed facts; where they cease to exist after the final judgment is rendered, and the party applies for retrial solely on this ground, the people’s court shall rule not to accept the application.”

方案二则是：”国务院商标管理部门对诉争商标驳回、不予核准注册或者无效宣告的事由在人民法院作出商标授权确权生效裁判前不复存在的，人民法院可以依据新的事实撤销国务院商标管理部门相关裁决，并判令其根据变更后的事实重新作出裁决；在生效裁判作出后不复存在，当事人仅以此为由申请再审的，人民法院裁定不予受理。”

In short: Scheme One closes at the “entry point” — the court looks only at the facts at the moment the ruling was made, and the entire correction channel disappears; Scheme Two sets a “segmented switch” — where the grounds vanish before the final judgment, the court may still correct, but where they vanish only after, a retrial application based solely thereon is not accepted. For current practice, Scheme One closes the whole channel, while Scheme Two preserves first- and second-instance correction and closes only the “retrial revival” segment. In other words, the draft offers no third option — keeping the current rule as is. Two schemes, one fully closed, one half-open, but pointing the same way: tightening.

简言之：方案一从”入口”关闭，法院只看裁决作出那一刻的事实，整条纠偏通道不复存在；方案二设置”分段开关”——生效裁判之前事由消失的，法院仍可纠偏，生效裁判之后仅凭事由消失申请再审的，不予受理。对现行实践而言，方案一关闭全部通道，方案二保留一审、二审的纠偏，关闭的是”再审复活”这一段。换句话说，征求意见稿没有提供第三个选项——维持现行规则原样。两套方案，一个全关，一个半开，方向却是同一个：收紧。

Why Change It: Three Motives in the Open Discussion

为什么要改：公开讨论中的三个动因

So why tighten a correction channel that has run for years?

那么，为什么要在此时收紧一条已经运行多年的纠偏通道？

Academic criticism of the doctrine of change of circumstances is long-standing. In an article in China Trademark, Issue 4, 2026, Peng Xuelong and Shi Ke argue that the change-of-circumstances doctrine should not apply in trademark administrative cases: frequent application undermines the stability of outcomes, easily leads to trademark coexistence and derivative disputes, and thereby unbalances the trademark rights-confirmation order. Drawing on the intellectual-property administration’s annual “Summary and Analysis of Administrative Litigation in Trademark Review Cases,” the article tallies that cases where the administration lost at first instance due to application of the change-of-circumstances doctrine rose from 66 in 2014 to a peak of 3,151 in 2023 (falling back to 2,837 in 2024); the proportion of administrative rulings revoked rose over the same period from 8% to 67.8%; and from 2020 to 2025, the Supreme People’s Court’s rate of reversing trademark administrative retrial judgments on the basis of change of circumstances reached as high as 72.3%.

学界对情势变更原则的批评早已有之。彭学龙、史珂在《中华商标》2026 年第 4 期撰文认为，商标行政案件不宜适用情势变更原则：频繁适用会影响案件处理结果的稳定性，容易导致商标共存并衍生纠纷，进而使商标确权秩序失衡。该文依据商标行政主管部门历年《商标评审案件行政诉讼情况汇总分析》统计：情势变更原则的适用导致国家知识产权局一审败诉的案件，由 2014 年的 66 件升至 2023 年的峰值 3151 件（2024 年回落至 2837 件）；行政裁决被撤销的比例同期由 8% 升至 67.8%；2020 年至 2025 年，最高人民法院在商标行政再审改判案件中基于情势变更改判的比例高达 72.3%。

In the author’s view, the above data and scholarly criticism point to three practical motives: first, a flood of retrial applications on this ground pours into the Supreme People’s Court — mostly simple facts and repetitive legal questions, with no value for establishing guiding precedent, merely draining the Court’s adjudicative resources; second, once a cited mark is revoked or invalidated, in theory any mark rejected years earlier could seek retrial and “revive,” undermining the stability and predictability of trademark-rights status; third, a considerable share of revocation cases in trademark administrative litigation relates to change of circumstances, visibly altering the structure of administrative-dispute resolution.

在笔者看来，上述数据与学理批评指向三个现实动因：其一，以此为由申请再审的案件大量涌入最高人民法院，大多案情简单、法律问题重复，不存在可供确立指导性裁判规范的价值，徒然耗费最高人民法院审判资源；其二，引证商标被撤销或无效后，理论上多年前被驳回的商标都可借此申请再审而”复活”，商标权利状态的稳定性与可预判性因此受损；其三，商标行政诉讼中相当比例的撤销案件与情势变更相关，行政争议的处理结构因此发生明显变化。

The author holds that these three points converge on one judgment: the crux is not correction itself, but the indeterminate endpoint of the correction channel — correction without an endpoint ultimately erodes everyone’s stable expectation of trademark status.

笔者认为，这三点指向同一个判断：症结不在纠偏本身，而在纠偏通道的终点不确定——没有终点的纠偏，最终会侵蚀所有人对商标状态的稳定预期。

How these differences are handled already received one answer in the amendment process. On June 26, 2026, the newly revised Trademark Law was adopted at the 23rd session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress and takes effect on January 1, 2027. The Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC, in item 4 of its “Report on the Results of Deliberation of the Draft Revision of the Trademark Law of the PRC,” states: “Paragraph 2 of Article 40 of the draft revision provided for the fact-finding issues in trademark administrative cases. Some members of the Standing Committee, departments, local legislative liaison points, industry associations, experts, scholars, and the public suggested that the provision touches upon specific judicial trial rules and fact-finding standards, and should not be provided in this Law, proposing that it be specified through judicial interpretation and the like. The Constitution and Law Committee, after study, recommends adopting this opinion and deleting paragraph 2 of Article 40 of the draft revision.”

这些分歧如何处置，修法过程已经给出过一次答案。2026 年 6 月 26 日，新修订的商标法经十四届全国人大常委会第二十三次会议表决通过，自 2027 年 1 月 1 日起施行。全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会《关于〈中华人民共和国商标法（修订草案）〉审议结果的报告》第四项载明：”修订草案第四十条第二款对商标行政案件的事实认定问题作了规定。有的常委委员、部门、基层立法联系点、行业协会、专家学者和社会公众提出，该规定涉及具体司法审判规则和事实认定标准，不宜在本法中作出规定，建议通过制定司法解释等方式对此作出具体规定。宪法和法律委员会经研究，建议采纳这一意见，删去修订草案第四十条第二款。”

In short, it was the opinions of all sides — including the public — that kept the clause excluding change of circumstances out of the statute; the legislature then expressly delegated this rule to judicial interpretation. In this round of amendment, enterprises won the rule — but its fate was merely postponed, not final.

简言之，正是包括社会公众在内的各方意见，让排除情势变更的条款没有进入法律；立法机关随之把这一规则明确指给了司法解释。企业在修法这一役中赢得了规则，但规则的命运只是被推迟，并未终局。

The Key to Abolition: Can Suspension Serve as a Backstop

取消与否的关键：中止能否兜底

Can change of circumstances simply be abolished? The real focus of the debate is not the doctrine itself, but its substitute mechanism — suspension.

能不能干脆取消情势变更？讨论的真正焦点不在情势变更本身，而在它的替代机制——中止。

The logic is straightforward. If, in refusal review and similar proceedings, a cited mark with pending status were uniformly suspended first and reviewed only after its final determination, then the post-litigation disappearance of grounds could be substantially reduced, and the cost of abolishing the correction channel made correspondingly manageable. Conversely, if suspension is merely a discretionary option, then by the time the cited mark’s revocation or invalidation proceeds, the later mark’s application may already have been rejected and finalized by a final judgment — leaving the applicant with no remedy at all.

道理并不复杂。如果在驳回复审等程序中，对权利状态待定的引证商标一律先行中止、待其终局确定后再行审查，那么进入诉讼后事由消失的情形本可大幅减少，取消纠偏通道的代价也相应可控。反之，如果中止只是裁量选项，那么在引证商标撤销、无效程序推进之际，在后商标的申请可能已经被驳回，并因生效判决而终局——申请人将失去全部补救途径。

Article 41 of the new Trademark Law provides: “Where, in the course of trademark opposition review, refusal review, refusal-of-registration review, or invalidation proceedings, the determination of the prior right involved must depend on the result of another case being tried by a people’s court or being handled by an administrative organ, the trademark administration may suspend the review or proceeding. Once the cause of suspension is removed, the review or proceeding shall be resumed promptly.” The word “may” reserves discretionary space for the examining authority.

新商标法第四十一条规定：”国务院商标管理部门在商标异议审查、驳回复审、不予注册复审和无效宣告案件审理过程中，所涉及的在先权益的确定必须以人民法院正在审理或者行政机关正在处理的另一案件的结果为依据的，可以中止审查审理。中止原因消除后，应当及时恢复审查审理程序。””可以”二字，为审查机关保留了裁量空间。

It should be noted that suspension review is not without a dedicated normative basis. In June 2023, the CNIPA Trademark Office issued the “Specification of Circumstances for Suspending Review Cases” and its interpretive notes, providing seven categories of “shall suspend” and three categories of “may suspend”; the notes candidly acknowledge that the previous “may suspend” wording “inevitably lacked consistency in actual execution,” and therefore revised the unifiable circumstances into “shall suspend” to “reduce discretionary space in execution.”

应当说明，中止审查目前并非没有专门的规范依托。2023 年 6 月，国家知识产权局商标局发布《评审案件中止情形规范》及其解读，规定了七种”应当中止”和三种”可以中止”的情形；解读同时坦言，以往”可以”中止的表述”在实际执行中难免不一致”，故将可以统一的情形修订为”应当”中止，以”减少执行中的自由裁量空间”。

The problem is which three categories were left under “may.” Per that specification: first, where the cited mark in a refusal-review case has been challenged by an invalidation petition and the cited mark’s registrant has been found to constitute bad-faith registration in another case, the review may be suspended; second, where it is necessary to await an earlier ruling or judgment in an identical or related case, suspension may be granted as the case requires; third, the catch-all “other circumstances in which suspension may be granted,” decided by the examiner on the principles of necessity and benefiting the legitimate rights holder.

问题在于，哪三类情形被留在了”可以”之列。按该规范：一是驳回复审案件所涉及的引证商标已被提起无效宣告请求，且引证商标注册人在其他案件中已被认定构成恶意注册情形的，可以中止审理；二是需要等待案情相同或者相关案件在先裁定或者判决的，根据个案需要，可以中止审理；三是未能穷尽的”其他可以中止审理的情形”，以必要性和有利于合法权利人为原则，由审查员自主决定。

In the author’s view, these three categories precisely cover the most common scenarios in practice requiring suspension pending determination of the cited mark’s status — yet the wording the specification retains for them is still “may suspend,” not “shall suspend.”

在笔者看来，这三类情形恰恰覆盖了实务中最常见的需要中止以待引证商标状态确定的场景——而规范为它们保留的表述，仍然是”可以中止”，而非”应当中止”。

In other words, even within this dedicated specification, the scenarios most needing suspension were not elevated to an obligation; and Article 41 at the statutory level provides only “may.” The objection to abolishing change of circumstances worries precisely about this layer: what the system relies on is, after all, not a legal obligation.

也就是说，即便在这份专门规范之内，最需要中止的那些场景也没有升格为义务；法律层面的第四十一条又只作”可以”的规定。反对取消情势变更的意见，担心的正是这一层：制度所依赖的毕竟不是法律义务。

Enterprises’ concern is not unfounded. The policy calibration in trademark examination has shifted before — the handling of coexistence agreements, the threshold for well-known-mark recognition, and the strictness of applying absolute-ground clauses such as deceptiveness and harmful influence have all visibly changed across periods. The concern thus arises: if examination policy later turns and “may suspend” lapses while the correction channel is already closed, rights holders will be left empty-handed on both ends.

企业的担忧并非无据。商标审查中的政策口径并非没有过调整——共存协议的审查掌握、驰名商标认定的尺度、欺骗性和不良影响等绝对理由条款的适用宽严，在不同时期均出现过明显变化。企业的担忧由此而来：一旦日后审查政策转向，”可以”中止落空，纠偏通道又已关闭，权利人将两头落空。

Therefore, the question the solicitation of comments should really answer may be framed thus: absent a statutory obligation to suspend, who bears, and how is compensated, the risk created by tightening or closing the change-of-circumstances channel? Scheme Two’s preservation of pre-final-judgment correction is precisely a partial response to this risk.

因此，此次征求意见真正要回答的问题，或许应当这样表述：在法律未将中止设为义务的前提下，收紧乃至关闭情势变更通道，由此产生的风险由谁承担、如何补偿？方案二保留生效裁判前的纠偏，正是对这一风险的部分回应。

The Uncertain Part Is Precisely the Most Critical

不确定的部分，恰恰最关键

So which scheme should enterprises prepare for now? The true adversary here is a popular expectation of certainty: the assumption that the script of the amendment will replay on the judicial interpretation — that enough opposition and the rule is preserved intact.

那么，企业现在应该按哪个方案做准备？这里真正的对手，是一种流行的确定性预期：以为修法时的剧本会在司法解释身上重演——只要反对意见足够多，规则就能原样保住。

It was indeed so at amendment time: the clause excluding change of circumstances was deleted amid loud opposition, and the rule “survived.” But this draft offers no “maintain the status quo” option; what is on the table is two tightening schemes, differing only in degree. In the author’s view, expecting the comments to preserve the current rule intact is probably not a realistic expectation; what is truly worth fighting for is preserving the limited correction in Scheme Two and pushing for the clarification and rigidification of suspension standards.

修法时确实如此：排除情势变更的条款因反对声音较大而被删去，规则”幸存”。但这一次的征求意见稿没有把”维持现状”列入选项，摆上台面的是两套收紧方案，差别只在收紧到什么程度。在笔者看来，指望征求意见让现行规则原样保留，恐怕不是现实的预期；真正值得争取的，是保住方案二中的有限纠偏，并推动中止标准的明确化、刚性化。

The decision draft draws a line for time effect: the new interpretation takes effect on January 1, 2027; for cases in which a final judgment was rendered before its effectiveness, retrial applications after its effectiveness do not apply the new interpretation. Per this provision, the new interpretation’s impact on current cases should be limited, and what enterprises need to consider seems mainly future alternative measures.

修改决定稿为时间效力划了一条线：新解释自 2027 年 1 月 1 日起施行，施行前已作出生效裁判的案件，施行后申请再审不适用新解释。据此规定，新解释对当前案件的影响应较为有限，企业需要考虑的似乎主要是未来的替代措施。

Even so, neither scheme should be treated as final, nor should the time-effect line drawn in the draft.

即便如此，两个方案仍都不宜当作定论，征求意见稿里为时间效力划下的那条线，同样不宜当作定论。

Three reasons. First, a draft for comment is not a final interpretation; the two schemes are published side by side, and which tier ultimately prevails remains unknown; unlike the amendment debate over “whether to write it into the statute,” this time the variable is mainly “degree,” not “existence or abolition.” Second, whether the time-effect line survives into the final text is likewise unknown. Third, the final text may also absorb comments and maneuver on the transition mechanism — for example, pushing the examining authority to “suspend wherever it should” for qualifying related proceedings, in exchange for tightening the correction channel; if so, the question of whether change of circumstances lives or dies becomes a question of refining suspension standards.

理由有三。其一，征求意见稿不等于正式解释，两套方案并列公开，最终落在哪一档仍是未知数；与修法时”要不要写入法律”之争不同，这一次的变数主要在”程度”而非”存废”。其二，时间效力的这条划线能否保留到正式文本，同样未知。其三，正式文本还可能吸收征求意见中的意见，在衔接机制上作文章——例如推动审查机关对符合条件的关联程序”应中止尽中止”，以换取纠偏通道的收紧；若如此，情势变更的存废问题将转化为中止标准的细化问题。

Before the final interpretation lands, enterprises can at least do three things: first, the comment period closes on October 28, 2026, and affected enterprises may submit opinions through the mail, email, and fax channels listed in the announcement — the aim of speaking up should focus on the choice between schemes and the clarification of suspension standards, not on restoring the status quo; second, prepare pending cases under both sets of rules to avoid one-sided betting; third, treat “re-application” as a contingency plan rather than a discard, to hedge the risk of losing the application-date interest.

在正式解释落地之前，企业至少可以做三件事：第一，征求意见截止于 2026 年 10 月 28 日，利益受影响的企业可以通过公告所列信函、电子邮件、传真渠道提交意见——此时发声的目标，应当聚焦于方案取舍与中止标准的明确化，而非恢复现状；第二，在途案件的诉讼准备按两套规则分别测算，避免单边押注；第三，把”重新申请”作为预案而非弃子，对冲申请日利益丧失的风险。

At amendment time, public opinion kept the rule alive; this time, the draft leaves it no “stay put” option. How much is lost, and how, still depends on the voice raised before the window closes — after October 28, 2026, little time remains for discussion.

修法时，公众意见让这条规则留了下来；这一次，征求意见稿没有给它留下”原地不动”的选项。失多少、怎么失，还取决于窗口关闭之前发出的声音——2026 年 10 月 28 日之后，留给讨论的时间就不多了。

Sources: Supreme People’s Court, “Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases of Trademark Authorization and Rights Confirmation (Draft for Comment)” (released September 14, 2026; comment period closes October 28, 2026) and “Provisions on the Application of the Trademark Law (Draft for Comment on Time Effect)”; current “Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases of Trademark Authorization and Rights Confirmation” (SPC Interpretation [2020] No. 19); “Interpretation on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law” (SPC Interpretation [2018] No. 1); the revised Trademark Law (adopted June 26, 2026; effective January 1, 2027), Article 41; CNIPA Trademark Office, “Specification of Circumstances for Suspending Review Cases” (June 2023); Peng Xuelong & Shi Ke, “Rethinking the Application of the Change-of-Circumstances Doctrine in Trademark Administrative Cases,” China Trademark, Issue 4, 2026.

来源：最高人民法院《关于审理商标授权确权行政案件若干问题的规定（征求意见稿）》（2026 年 9 月 14 日发布，征求意见截止 2026 年 10 月 28 日）及《关于适用〈中华人民共和国商标法〉时间效力的若干规定（征求意见稿）》；现行《最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行政案件若干问题的规定》（法释〔2020〕19 号）；《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国行政诉讼法〉的解释》（法释〔2018〕1 号）；新修订《商标法》（2026 年 6 月 26 日通过，2027 年 1 月 1 日施行）第四十一条；国家知识产权局商标局《评审案件中止情形规范》（2023 年 6 月）；彭学龙、史珂：《情势变更原则在商标行政案中的适用反思》，《中华商标》2026 年第 4 期。